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 While emergentism is a frequently debated and contentious topic in some areas 
of philosophy, it is not discussed as often in the sciences. Where it does appear in 
scientific literature, it is usually a weak formulation that admits as emergent many 
entities and properties that would not be considered emergent under a stronger 
formulation. Premature admission of this sort sometimes occurs in the context of 
physics, but it is more likely to occur in higher-level sciences like biology. In this thesis, I 
examine the claim that life, a fundamental biological feature, is emergent. In order to do 
this, I begin by examining what counts as life. I settle on three features that are 
necessary for life as we know it, and I show that the smallest unit of life is the 
prokaryotic cell. I then examine the received view of emergentism and identify its key 
tenets. I consider two of these in depth, as they play a crucial role in my argument. 
Finally, I consider weaker formulations of emergence found in scientific literature in 
order to contrast them with the robust philosophical notion developed within this thesis. I 
argue that, based on a strong formulation of emergence, life should not be considered 
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 This thesis discusses two topics—the philosophical notion of emergence, and 
biology—and asks whether a particular, fundamental biological feature—life—should be 
deemed emergent. Emergentism is not yet at home in science, but there has been a 
marked increase of late in attempts to introduce it into scientific terminology.  This is 
most common in the area of physics, where the goal is to understand the universe and 
its contents at the most basic level. However, it is possible to examine claims of 
emergence at higher levels as well, and the unique nature of life on Earth makes it a 
prime candidate for emergence. While the question whether life is emergent is by no 
means decisively settled, I will argue in this thesis that, given reasonable 
characterizations of life and emergence, life should not be considered emergent.  
 In order to probe this area properly, we need first to know what is meant in saying 
that something is alive. We can only follow our intuitions so far here; they act as a 
reasonably sufficient guide for many of the macroscopic entities with which we are 
already familiar, but they quickly falter when we consider microscopic, unicellular 
entities whose processes are superficially very different from our own. Relatively recent 
advances in genetics and molecular biology allow us to explore in much greater detail 
possible traits that may be common to all life forms. In the first chapter I use these 
findings to arrive at a definition of life that identifies three necessary features, and that 
can then be used to examine claims of emergence.  
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 But a concrete understanding of what counts as living is only half of what is 
needed before the desired analysis can take place; we still need to understand what 
emergence means. This is not an easy job, and it is rarely explicated in the scientific 
literature in which it is used. Thus, it is necessary to develop a robust notion of 
emergence, and to distinguish this form of emergence from the weaker versions that 
pervade the scientific literature. To accomplish the first task, in the second chapter, I 
appeal to Jaegwon Kim’s characterization of the received view of emergence. This 
provides a strong formulation that includes key tenets that demand more of proposed 
emergents than mere increasing complexity. To accomplish the second task 
(diagnosing the common, weaker form of emergence), in the third chapter I review an 
exemplary case to show that the weak version of emergence differs substantially from 
the robust, philosophical notion of emergence I apply to life. 
 With the requisite treatments of the topics of life and emergence completed, I 
move on to argue that life should not be considered emergent. There are two reasons to 
think this, both of which are dependent on the necessity of certain tenets in the strong 
formulation of emergentism that I adopt. I end by noting that possible objections to my 
argument may include formulations of emergentism that leave out or reject some of 









 What is life? This simple question is both fundamental and daunting, and we 
have learned that there is no easy answer. It is fundamental because, for thousands of 
years, humans have posed this question and offered in return views and speculations 
about the commonalities of life that yield insight into past cultures, their spiritual and 
religious beliefs, and their understanding of the natural world; and, it is daunting 
because life is incredibly complex. Yet at least some level of conceptual clarity 
regarding life is necessary if one is to be able to examine life as an emergent property. 
And that is, indeed, the goal of this chapter: to arrive at a characterization of life that will 
allow for later analysis of life in the context of emergence. To get there, in the next 
section I will begin by discussing how even a very basic view of life is able to discern 
similarities between life forms. This intuition is well supported by developments in the 
biological sciences. Once this connection is established, I move on, in the third section, 
to discussing some proposed definitions of life, followed by developing a definition of my 
own which distills several different scientific views of life down to three key components. 
I also argue in the third section that there is a basic unit of life in which these features 
are found. In the final section, I apply my definition to four common “borderline” cases of 




1.2 Life in Common 
 
 I want to begin with a hypothetical scenario in which we must search for the 
criteria of life from scratch. The most immediate form of life with which we are 
acquainted is ourselves—that is, humans. This familiarity provides a starting point from 
which we may look outwards, cautiously, in search of possible connections between all 
life on Earth. We are, of course, already quite aware of the cycle which begins at birth, 
and after which we are inexorably drawn towards our death. In between those two 
extremes—the bounds of individual existence, individual life—we have a great many 
experiences, most of which will shape our character in some way, but very few of which 
are reflected in our bodily appearance. Apart from growth, that seems to occur as well in 
other humans of the same approximate age and for the same approximate duration, our 
physical characteristics appear mostly to be fixed at birth. Perhaps the most notable 
event within an individual life is the physical union undertaken with another individual 
life, the general purpose of which is to create the beginnings of a new individual life, to 
continue the cycle. Already, then, we have a very simple model of life, at least insofar as 
we know it from direct experience. 
 This four-point model of human life, consisting of birth, growth, sexual 
procreation, and death, is exceedingly crude, but it captures many of the similarities we 
find as we expand our search outwards from humans to other potential life forms. How 
best to expand this search is a difficult problem, but if we use as a rough guide the 
template generated above, we would have a considerable degree of success. This 
pattern, for example, would pick out almost all mammals, reptiles, birds, insects, and 
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plant life, though a generous interpretation of sexual reproduction is required in the case 
of many plants, and we would run into further problems with species that reproduce 
asexually. Still, even in these cases we certainly want to say that these animals are 
alive; the problem is how to do it without tying ourselves in conceptual knots. We could 
loosen the restriction that reproduction be sexual, to allow for asexual reproduction, and 
this would seem to be progress1.  Perhaps we could also lose the requirements of birth 
and death, because we know of nothing that is able to grow and reproduce that isn’t 
also born2 and doesn’t also die or end. Should we rest, then, with this winnowed 
variation of the original cycle of human life, accepting as living only those entities that fit 
this pattern of growth and reproduction? It is clear today, with the benefit of much 
scientific knowledge, that we cannot, but it is equally clear that we should not dismiss 
the pattern’s hints too quickly.  
 There are other patterns we have discovered and investigated, patterns which 
indicate, amongst other things, and to the surprise of many people, a common origin for 
all life on Earth; this is the picture painted, for example, by both evolutionary biology and 
molecular biology. An extensive, though not exhaustive, summary of these reasons is 
found in Morowitz (1992). To anticipate points of the discussion that will follow, several 
noteworthy patterns are described below. 
 
• The water content of functioning living forms varies from 50% to over 95% (p. 41). 
                                            
1 Progress only insofar is it moves us towards what we know to be life if we step outside the human-first 
approach. 
2 Provided that we make the definition of born sufficiently broad, something like “comes into existence”. 
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• There is a universal set of small organic molecules that constitute a large portion 
of the total mass of all cellular systems (p. 44). 
• There exists a universal network of intermediate reactions such that the metabolic 
chart of any extant species is a subset of the universal chart (p. 49). 
• There is a universal type of membrane structure used in all biological systems (p. 
55). 
• Every replicating cell has a genome made of deoxyribonucleic acid that stores the 
genetic information of the cell, which may be read out in sequences of 
ribonucleotides and translated into polypeptides (p. 56). 
• All populations of replicating biological systems give rise to altered phenotypes 
that are the result of mutated genotypes (p. 57) 
 
Perhaps the most profound question this enables us to answer is why we should think 
that there is a singular type of life, with characteristics in common, at all. This is, I think, 
something we now take for granted, but it not at all an obvious conclusion based on 
observation alone. It is, after all, perfectly plausible to think that life could have 
originated many times, each with its own evolutionary path; thus, were conditions in the 
past (significantly) different, the extant species we observe today could represent many 
different kinds of life.  However, the patterns described above, along with still others, 
paint a picture of life with a single point of origin and a single, distant, common ancestor, 
the fundamental (and selectively beneficial) features of which were continually passed 
vertically through countless generations. It is the common features which have not 
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changed at all, at least from the time of that common ancestor forwards, that we seek to 






1.3 Components of Life 
 
 It is obvious from the reflections of the previous section that we share a 
connection with all life forms, and that this connection is best understood in the 
language of certain branches of microbiology, namely, molecular and cellular biology. If 
what it is to be alive is related to this connection, as I have already suggested, then it is 
reasonable to expect that a competent characterization of life should involve concepts 
and explanations from those same biological disciplines. While we may take away some 
hints as to what direction to investigate from the pattern of life followed by our own 
species (and observed in others, too), we need to find out whether there is any deeper 
biological explanation that will help in composing a robust notion of life. 
 Before investigating some existing definitions of life to see what might be 
gleaned, I want to introduce and adopt the terminology of Mahner and Bunge (1997) in 
order to clarify the discussion in general, and, in particular, what precisely is being 
sought in this chapter. Mahner and Bunge set forth a hierarchy of definitions, each 
building on and incorporating the previous ones. They begin with the general term 
biosystem, which is defined, quite rigorously, as follows (pp. 141-142):  
 
There are concrete systems of a kind B such that for every member b of 
B, 
 
(i) b is composed of chemical and biochemical subsystems, in particular 
water, proteins, nucleic acids, carbohydrates, and lipids; 
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(ii) the components of b are sufficiently contiguous so as to permit 
continual (bio)chemical interactions amongst them;  
(iii) the boundary of b involves a flexible and semi-permeable lipid 
membrane (biomembrane); 
(iv) b incorporates some of the biomolecules it synthesizes (rather than 
releasing them immediately to its habitat) 
(v) the possible activities of b include the assembly, rearrangement, and 
dismantling of components (which allow for the self-maintenance of b 
over a certain time) as well as the capture and storing of free energy 
(e.g., in ATP molecules) for future consumption (metabolism); 
(vi) some of the subsystems of b regulate most of the processes 
occurring in b in such a way that a fairly constant milieu interieur is 
maintained in the system (homeostasis, self-regulation); 
(vii) one of the subsystems of b involved in self-regulation—its genic 
system—is composed of nucleic acid molecules, and its interaction with 
other subsystems of b (co)regulates the self-maintenance, as well as the 
development, if any, and the reproduction, if any, of b; 
(viii) all of the control systems in b are interconnected by chemical 
signals (such as the diffusion of ions, atoms, or molecules, and 
propagating chemical reactions) and thus constitute a (chemical) signal 
network; 





I will take up the definition of biosystem given above shortly, because, ultimately, it will 
form much of the backbone of the description of life on which I will settle. Mahner and 
Bunge (1997, p. 142) go on to say that “[t]he systems of kind B referred to [above] are 
called biosystems, living systems, living things, or living beings [emphasis original],” and 
the collection of all “living systems” are what they take to be life. The elementary 
biosystem is the most basic unit of life, and thus forms the base of the hierarchy; they 
define it as: “any biosystem such that none of its components is a biosystem” (Mahner 
and Bunge,  1997, p. 146). A collection of these unitary biosystems is called a 
composite biosystem, which is “any biosystem composed of (at least two elementary) 
biosystems” (Mahner and Bunge, 1997, p. 147). The final distinction they make 
represents “largest ‘unit of life’”, the organism: “An organism is a biosystem (whether 
elementary or composite) which is not a proper subsystem of a biosystem” (Mahner and 
Bunge, 1997, pp. 147-148).  
 Having taken these terms on board, the original motivation for this chapter can 
be restated. Rather than attempting to answer the very broad question “What is life?” 
we can focus only on the most basic unit of life, the elementary biosystem, and ask how 
it is realized. We can safely ignore, for the purposes of this chapter, questions about the 
higher-order forms of life, because as composite biosystems or organisms (of the non-
elementary biosystem kind) they must be comprised of living things. It is trivial to note 
that these more complex forms of life will differ in many respects from elementary 
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biosystems, but as they are themselves biosystems, I do not believe we need to explain 
what makes them living beyond noting that they meet all criteria outlined above.3  
 The extensive definition of biosystem already provided is an excellent starting 
point for assessing which biological features to include and which to exclude in a 
reasonable definition of life; as I have stated, it will be a refined version of Mahner and 
Bunge’s list upon which I will settle. However, the viability of trying to list all relevant 
features of life has been questioned, and, I think, for good reason. Taken to its extreme, 
we find definitions consisting of a single quality or parameter which are supposed to 
explain everything, including origin (Popa, 2004). Of course it is unlikely that such 
simplistic definitions will suffice, but I disagree with Popa that, in general, all parametric 
definitions are doomed to fail. Provided that we are willing to revise the parameters we 
choose if given cause to do so, I can see no reason why we should not adopt a 
parametric definition, similar in structure to the definition of biosystem, and tinker with it 
according to how it performs in the field. Indeed, to foreshadow the topic of the next 
section, how we assess the many borderline cases of life that exist based on our 
definitions will tell us much about the definitions’ adequacy.  
 Though I began the previous section with a caricatured version of how we might 
start to search for the criteria of life, we do not in reality need to begin with a blank slate. 
There is enough of a consensus in molecular biology today regarding many of the 
processes of life that we can state now with confidence what years ago would have 
                                            
3 Mahner and Bunge (p. 149) state that the “organism is, by definition, the largest living entity”, which 
excludes the existence of “superorganisms”, such as colonies or societies, that are themselves living 
units. Whether one agrees with this or not, it does not affect the argument of this chapter; however, I do 
not find their reasons for denying superorganisms to be compelling. 
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been controversial. (This is not to say that there is a consensus as to which processes 
are necessary to life but rather that the details of how many of these processes work 
and relate to each other at the molecular level is well understood.) Before returning to 
the definition of biosystem, I want to present several characterizations of life that will be 
of assistance in analyzing and pruning the definition proposed by Mahner and Bunge.  
 Popa (2004) lists three dominant models concerning the origin of life. What is of 
interest to this discussion is the observation that the models agree on the necessary 
features of life, but disagree as to the order in which they came into existence. The 
importance of these features—cellularization, replication through genetic mechanisms, 
and metabolism—must have been “primordial, because none of them was dispensable 
[emphasis mine]” (Popa, 2004, 11). He goes on to critique these models, saying that the 
question of particular importance is not which came first, “but rather what type of 
mechanism they were represented by in different evolutionary episodes.” Maynard 
Smith and Szathmáry (1999, p. 4) place similar emphasis on “multiplication, variation, 
and heredity”, for the reason that “they are necessary if a population is to evolve all the 
other characteristics that we associate with life.” Morowitz (1992, p. 8) holds that the 
cellular barrier, and in particular the thermodynamic isolation it affords, “is an irreducible 
condition of life”. His 1992 monograph is titled Beginnings of Cellular Life, not Origins of 
Life, because “the only life we know for certain is cellular” (Morowitz, 1992, p. 12). 
Schejter and Agassi (1994, p. 8) claim that the “unique characteristic of life” is “the 
(entropically unfavorable) permanent transfer of matter against a gradient.” This is 
perhaps an example of the parametrically-extreme definition against which Popa 
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cautions, but it serves to indicate the importance to life of thermodynamic 
considerations. Indeed there are a great many attempts to characterize life in the 
scientific and philosophical literature—Popa (2004) has cataloged over 100 
definitions—and there are numerous examples found there that support the theme 
already developed by Mahner and Bunge. A few of these, found in Popa (2004, pp. 
199-205), are provided below. 
 
Any system capable of replication and mutation is alive. 
 
The criteria of living systems are: metabolism, self-reproduction, and 
spatial proliferation. The more complicated kinds also have the ability to 
mutate and evolve. 
 
Life is defined as a system of nucleic acid and protein polymerases with 
a constant supply of monomer, energy and protection. 
 
In order to be recognizable life must: 1. be a non-equilibrium chemical 
system; 2. contain organic polymers; 3. reproduce itself; 4. metabolize 
by itself; 5. be segregated from the environment. 
 
We propose to define living systems as those that are: (1) composed of 
bounded micro-environments in thermodynamic equilibrium with their 
surroundings; (2) capable of transforming energy to maintain their low-
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entropy states; and (3) able to replicate structurally distinct copies of 
themselves from an instructional code…. 
 
 We can now return to Mahner and Bunge’s definition of biosystem, to see how it 
compares to the various definitions of life given above. Point (iii) is certainly the easiest 
to examine, since it clearly picks out the idea of cellularization. Points (iv) through (vi) 
can be grouped together under the heading of metabolism, with the additional note that 
the type of metabolism suggested there requires the sort of semipermeable membrane 
dictated by point (iii). Points (vii) and (ix) specify the requirements for replication and 
adaptation (the latter requires heritability and variability), and will be useful in the 
discussion of examples of non-reproducing life forms found in the next section. Point (ii) 
seems not to pertain to particular characteristic life—though it is certainly necessary—
so much as to assist in distinguishing one biosystem from the next; it is reasonable, I 
think, to consider (ii) as implicitly included in the definitions provided above, having 
been spelled out explicitly by Mahner and Bunge for the sake of formality. This may be 
said of point (viii) as well, which describes the necessity of a chemical signal network 
within the biosystem. This leaves points (i), which seems to be simply a contingent fact 
based, in large in part, on Earth’s environment during biogenesis, as well as the actual 
historical (rather than chemically or physically possible) path travelled by evolution. 
There is one additional point which needs to be added to the original definition because, 
as already noted, we are interested primarily in elementary biosystems. Therefore, I 
shall add point (x), which states that for a biosystem to be elementary, none of its 
components can be a biosystem.  
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 The recurring components throughout the definitions of life can now be identified.  
They are cellularization, metabolism, and heredity4, and they form the basis of the 
definition of life that I will use in this thesis. Explicitly, these features were selected for 
their prevalence in the literature on the origin and definitions of life, combined with their 
observed universality in all life examined to date. Each can be broken down further—
exemplified both in some of the points listed by Mahner and Bunge above, and by a 
further clarification to the notion of heredity that will be presented in the next section—
but as fundamental features of life, so far as we know, they must be present.   
  Three things remain to be accomplished in this chapter: first, to specify briefly 
the biological role of each component; second, to suggest and discuss the basic unit of 
life in which these three components are found; and third, to assess the field 




The possession of a means of separating an entity from its environment is undeniably a 
necessary component of life (Popa, 2004; Morowitz, 1992). Some entities, such as 
viruses, are protected by a very simple barrier—often only a protein coating—the sole 
function of which is to protect the virus’s genetic core from hydrolysis. More complex 
entities, especially those with active metabolisms, require membranes that allow for 
selective transportation to occur across them. These membranes are spherically 
                                            
4 As will become clear, I follow Maynard Smith in insisting that heredity be accompanied by variation. As a 
shorthand I will simply use heredity, but all further instances of heredity should be taken to include 
variation as well. 
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shaped amphipatic bilayers, consisting of two fatty acids arranged such that their 
hydrophobic ends are buried in the center of the bilayer, while the hydrophilic ends face 
outwards into the aqueous solutions that make up the interior of the cell and the exterior 
surrounding the cell. Some of the benefits of cellularization are listed below. 
 
• thermodynamic protection, resulting from “increased ability to withstand 
hydrolysis” leads to increase in the entity’s half life (Popa, 2004, p. 53) 
• creation of directional flow of energy by confining catalyst activity to primary 
vesicles (Popa, 2004). 
• creation and maintenance of “sharp (i.e., energy rich) gradients, used by life 
as energy currencies. The osmotic arrest of large molecules...also allowed 
the confinement of large [nucleic acids] which could serve as genetic 
materials” (Popa, 2004, p. 55) 
• possible impetus for creation of the genome, by confining genes together 




Even the most basic empirical analysis of life must recognize immediately the 
importance of an intake-process-excrete cycle. On a macroscopic scale, it is manifested 
in numerous ways (e.g. eating food). At the molecular level, metabolism is a sequence 
(pathway) of chemical reactions within a biosystem that are, notably, assisted by 
numerous enzymes. Enzymes are (typically) proteins that increase the speed and 
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efficiency of the reactions they catalyze, enabling reactions which are 
thermodynamically unfavorable to occur. The products of metabolism vary greatly 
depending on where the reaction sits in a metabolic pathway; intermediate products are 
often used a substrates in the next reaction in the chain, while end products have 
specific roles within the cell, such as “an amino acid that can be incorporated into a 
polypeptide, or a sugar that can be consumed for its energy content” (Karp, 2005, p. 
108). In short, metabolism provides biosystems with (among other things) a means to 




It is not enough to insist only that life must replicate (or multiply). Some kinds of 
replication simply would not work for life—for example, replication exhibited by crystals 
or fire (see next section), or by some other process, such as from a mold. Importantly, 
all life forms on Earth exhibit heredity—that is, they pass along, through various means, 
information (“blueprints”) for, or that contribute to, the construction the next generation 
of biosystem. Over time, however, this information can slowly become changed by the 
accrual of small, statistically inescapable genetic mutations (variations) (Morowitz, 
1992). These mutations may or may not have an effect on the biosystem’s ability to 
reproduce, but if they do, those mutations which produce a favorable reproductive effect 
will, in time, become dominant. This is the familiar concept of natural selection. Thus, 
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both heredity and and variability are required if natural selection is to take place, as we 
observe it to.  
 
 These features of life which I have identified as necessary can be stated explicitly 
as three postulates.  
 
Postulate 1: living things must have heredity with variation (or, 
equivalently, be subject to natural selection); 
Postulate 2: living things must have a metabolism; 
Postulate 3: living things must have a selectively permeable barrier 
separating them from their environment; 
 
Crucially (and perhaps obviously), by stipulating the necessity of each of the above 
features it follows that they must always be found together for the system to be 
considered living. The next section will examine some cases where one or more 
features is missing.   
 Empirical observation supports the conclusion that the most fundamental unit in 
which these features are found is the cell (Hurst, 1937; Eigen, 1992; Morowitz, 1992, 
2002; Popa, 2004, Mahner and Bunge, 1997). This can be restated in the following way 
(Mahner and Bunge, 1997, p. 146): 
 




The converse, however, is not necessarily true. A classic example is the eukaryotic cell, 
which contains several organelles (mitochondria, chloroplasts) that appear to be former 
bacteria that have been captured and enslaved over the course of evolution. Another 
example, given by Mahner and Bunge (1997, p. 147), comes from the single-celled 
ciliates, which contain single-celled “algal symbionts, such as zoochlorellae. Clearly, 
these algae are not only biosystems but also components...of a ciliate cell. Thus, when 
containing zoochlorellae…[a cell] is not an elementary biosystem.” Morowitz (1992, p. 
39) sees the view that cells are the basic units of life as “so much a part of an overview 
that it is rarely necessary to make explicit.” He also describes in detail the mollicutes, “a 
class of wall-less prokaryotes that are judged to contain the smallest cells by visible 
microscopy, electron microscopy, and filtration through small, pore-sized barriers” (p. 
59). These deserve further consideration, since they point to the likely existence of a 
lower bound on size and simplicity which supports the notion that cells are in fact the 
elementary unit of life. 
 The first thing to note about some Mycoplasmatales is their diameter, which can 
be “as small as the order of 0.3 microns” (Morowitz, 1992, p. 59). He continues,  
 
 If we consider the hardware necessary to perform [various tasks 
including metabolism, membrane construction, protein synthesis, and 
replication], the need for enough atoms clearly imposes a lower size limit 
imposed by atomicity. For example, consider a hypothetical cell half the 
diameter of the small mycoplasma. The radius would be 0.075 µ, and since 
the membrane is about 0.005 µ in thickness, the inner sphere would have a 
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radius of 0.07 µ. The nonaqueous portion of the interior would contain 4 x 
107 atoms. Since the average macromolecule contains about 104 atoms, 
the cell contains only four thousand total macromolecules of all types. 
Alternatively, this number of atoms could make up a small genome, ten 
ribosomes, and the order of one thousand protein molecules. Clearly, this is 
pushing an absolute limit for the number of functions that must be 
performed by a cell. 
 
Its small size also limits its metabolic complexity, because much of its genome is taken 
up by regions which code for the machinery of replication. Morowitz estimates the 
number of proteins coded for by the DNA of mycoplasma at about 550 (329,000 amino 
acids at approximately 600 amino acids per protein); this further “defines a level of 
functional simplicity at which cells can operate, since proteins, with some notable 
exceptions tend to have single enzymatic functions and may have one or more control 
factors” (Morowitz, 1992, p. 62). He concludes his discussion of mycoplasma by saying 
that “it is apparent that these forms fit all the criteria for life...and have reduced the 
necessary hardware for survival to something near a minimum” (Morowitz, 1992, pp. 65-
66).  
 Though the case for the chosen criteria is well supported and its conclusion, that 
all elementary biosystems are cells, is well accepted, it is important to examine some 








 Taking stock, we now have a working template for life, which consists of three 
key features (cellularization, metabolism, and heredity), along with an idea of what the 
most basic unit is in which all three features are found (the cell). And we do not say that 
only cells are alive but, rather, that anything comprised of, at least in part, (functioning) 
cells is alive, too; thus we have both living single- and multi-cellular organisms. In 
essence, by emphasizing the importance of the cell as the basic unit of life, we have 
allowed for the label of living to be applied to all organisms which we would want to 
claim as living a priori, because they are all, loosely speaking, large collections of cells 
working together. But, we have also enabled the application of the term living to 
microscopic organisms, with which our cells, as individual units of life, have much in 
common. We are all a part of one enormously extended family, and it is for this reason 
that we have life in common. 
 It is no good to have a definition of life that is useless in practice. There are many  
organisms which sit on the fence between life and non-life, with their status, often as 
not, being determined by the specifics of the definition of life one adopts. We have seen 
this in practice earlier, where I examined life by considering the human life cycle as a 
starting point; though such a definition captured many macroscopic (multi-cellular) 
extant species which we would certainly want to think of as living (mammals, reptiles, 
birds, fish, and so on), it was also too strict. By moving towards a more fundamental 
definition, the number of species included within its definitional boundary increased 
dramatically. Now, we need to explore its proposed borders. Thus, in this section I want 
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to examine some borderline cases by making use of the definition I have developed so 
far. Each of the examples were selected both for their prominence—they are often 
trotted out in discussions of life—and for the particular component of the definition they 
emphasize. Thus, these considerations should be taken as illustrative of what should be 




 The first case to consider is fairly simple: fire. Most people, and especially those 
who have not reflected on what it means to be alive, do not think fire is living. Why, then, 
should it even be considered? The primary reason is that the example of fire is, I think, 
the easiest way to demonstrate the importance of the joint possession of the features of 
life identified in the particular definition I have chosen. Fire clearly has a metabolism: it 
receives fuel which, after undergoing chemical reactions, is changed into products 
(mostly in the form of water and carbon dioxide) that then leave the system. This is 
metabolism as its most basic level, and it is in this way that fire can grow, provided it is 
given a constant supply of fuel. If the fuel supply is turned off, the fire quickly dies out. 
This can be compared to the necessity of food and water for animals, or to the 
availability of many key molecules in metabolic pathways (such as glycogen and ATP). 
In the absence of a stable supply of these products, the metabolic pathways shut down 
and life is eventually extinguished.  
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 Fire can also replicate, a fact made trivially evident by observance of (the flames 
of) lighters and matches spawning “daughter fires”; furthermore, these daughter fires 
even display variation, both between each other and alone, through time. Interestingly, if 
we adopted the simple human cycle as a definition of life, it would seem that fire must 
be considered alive as well. So how does fire stack up against Postulates 1-3? Most 
obviously, fire lacks both heredity and cellularization, both of which are necessary for 
fire to be deemed alive. While fire is able to replicate, “the characteristics of a fire 
depend only on the supply of fuel and oxygen at the time, and not on whether the fire 
was lit by a match or cigarette lighter. Lacking heredity, fire does not evolve, and so 
lacks the adaptive complexity that only natural selection can confer” (Maynard Smith, 
1999, p.5). Nor does fire have any concrete physical structure associated with it; it is 
simply a physical space in which the fueled chemical reactions are taking place, with no 
boundary (but, rather, the characteristics of the fuel source) to confine the reaction 
space. We can conclude that, in lacking two crucial features, fire cannot be alive. 
  
Viruses 
 The next case to be examined, viruses, is, arguably, the most frequently debated, 
because it is often found on the fence between living and non-living. It is a textbook 
example of a system whose status is determined by the subtleties of the definition of life 
one chooses. A description of viruses is given by Karp (2005, p. 21):  
 
Outside of a living cell, the virus exists as a particle, or virion, which is 
little more than a macromolecular package. The virion contains a small 
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amount of genetic material that, depending on the virus, can be single-
stranded or double-stranded, RNA or DNA. Remarkably, some viruses 
have as few as three or four different genes, but others may have as 
many as several hundred. The fewer the genes, the more the virus relies 
on enzymes and other proteins encoded by its host cell’s genes.  
 
It seems that the controversy surrounding the status of viruses is primarily the result of 
their being acted on by natural selection. Viruses are infamously known for their ability 
to adapt at a rapid pace, making attempts to contain or destroy them exceedingly 
difficult. Their small genomes lead to high mutation rates in the copies produced, so that 
mutations that exhibit immunity to anti-viral agents quickly become selected for. When 
this fact is combined with their high speed of replication, viruses become perfect case-
studies in natural selection. On some accounts of life, the ability to be acted on by 
natural selection is sufficient for the entity to qualify as living. Because viruses mimic so 
closely the patterns of replication we observe in all life forms, it is easy to understand 
the confusion.   
 However, what is notably absent is an autonomous metabolism. They are mere 
replication-machines, ultimately dependent on the host cells they invade for their 
replication to take place, though some (for example, plus-strand RNA viruses) are more 
dependent than others (minus-strand RNA viruses, retroviruses). In particular, the 
molecules utilized for replication are located within the confines of the host cell’s 
membrane, and it is the host cell’s own replication machinery (with the addition of an 
introduced replication enzyme for minus-strand viruses) which carries out the 
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replication. By contrast, the amino acids used by cells are often obtained through 
various internal metabolic reactions—and this is precisely what is hijacked by the virus. 
Thus, because viruses lack their own metabolism, we can say that while the cell-virus 
system is alive, the virus itself is not. This is echoed by Karp (2005, p. 22): “virions are 
macromolecular aggregates, inanimate particles that, by themselves, are unable to 
reproduce, metabolize, or carry on any of the other activities associated with life. For 
this reason, viruses are not considered to be organisms and are not described as being 
alive. [emphasis mine]” 
  
Sterility and Dysfunction 
 The third example I want to consider presents an interesting challenge to the 
definition of life offered in the previous section. Recall that this postulate requires the 
joint possession of the features identified by postulates 1-3 in order for something to be 
deemed living. However, there are numerous examples of entities that, often as a result 
of mutation, do not (strictly speaking) have one of the required features. It is evident that 
the lack of a barrier is almost certainly a fatal mutation, and need not be considered. So 
too, it seems, is the lack of a metabolism. It is exceedingly unlikely that such large 
mutations would occur, at any rate; much more likely than wholesale absence is small-
scale mutation resulting in dysfunction. It is this sort of mutation that we must consider 
when we examine particular (or token) biosystems with faulty membranes, metabolisms, 
or means of reproduction. These token biosystems should be differentiated from the 
biosystem’s type, which generally includes working versions of these subsystems. We 
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can partially alleviate this concern by stipulating that “some of the properties of 
biosystems are dispositions that may actualize under favorable circumstances” (Mahner 
and Bunge, 1997, p. 143). Systematic dysfunction, then, merely renders the 
circumstances for actuation of the particular feature unfavorable. Thus, infertile 
members of species that otherwise exhibit the feature of heredity are clearly living, 
despite the fact that, as instantiations of a biosystem, they are unable to reproduce; the 
same goes for tokens which have faulty metabolisms, or structural deformities. 
 However, there is a related but distinct problem in the form of subsets of a 
population which, through evolution, have lost one or more of the key features. Sterile 
castes of insects fit this description, as do erythrocytes, which do not carry the genetic 
material necessary for replication or protein synthesis. In the case of sterile castes of 
insects, it is not a problematic mutation that has led to their inability to reproduce; their 
sterility is, for their functional purposes, an evolutionary feature of the subset of the 
species of which they are members. The crucial point that allows this case to be 
decided lies in the composition of the notion of heredity. Until now I have considered 
heredity to be tied intricately with replication, hence the current problem. However, what 
is often missed due, I think, to its implicit nature is the fact that biosystems are also 
products of heredity. So, insofar as we are concerned here, heredity is a two-part 
concept; being on the receiving end of heritable transmission simply takes a back seat 
to replication with heredity most of the time. In most instances it is not necessary to 
spell out the former requirement because it is always the case, but frequent omission 
may leave it seeming less important than it really is. In fact, it is the true requirement for 
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heredity, and it is only because it so often results in successive generations passing 
along their genetic information in the same way that reproduction-with-heredity is 
identified with life at all. All individuals in sterile castes were passed genetic information 
in the same way as their fertile neighbors. The difference between them lies in what that 
information specified. We do not need to insist that each member be able to replicate—
we have seen already that particular mutations make this impossible—but instead that 
each individual be the result of reproduction in which genetic information was passed 
along, regardless of the reproductive capabilities it specifies.  
 It is worth mentioning, if only briefly, that the above requirement of being a 
product of heritable transmission may appear to impose conditions on life that depend 
not only on the properties of a biosystem at a given time, but also on its history. We can 
get around this by noting that we only know biosystems that are a product of evolution; 
we never see complex entities that exhibit the requisite characteristics of life arising de 
novo. Thus, in observing such entities, we can safely assume that they are indeed 
products of heritable transmission. 
  
Artificial Life 
 The final challenge I will examine is artificial life (AL). It is most often conceived 
today as computer-based (artificial intelligence, or AI), but it need not be. Proponents of 
strong AL have as their goal the synthesis of “life-forms alternative to the ‘carbon-chain 
life’ as known to biology ‘by attempting to capture the behavioral essence of the 
constituent components of a living system, and endowing a collection of artificial 
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components with similar behavioral repertoires…’” (Mahner and Bunge, 1997, pp. 149-
150). In their analysis of the strong AL program, Mahner and Bunge, quoting 
Rasmussen, note the irrelevance to its supporters of the composition of the candidate 
systems: “...the ontological status of a living process is independent of the hardware 
that carries it” (Mahner and Bunge, 1997, p. 150). Their critique (pp. 150-151) of the 
strong AL program is based on the fact that  
 
the biosystems on our planet are the only living things we know. Hence, 
whatever artificial system is presumed to exhibit some property or 
properties of (genuine) biosystems, it can be compared only to the 
biosystems known to biologists. Thus, AL technologists cannot show 
that they have succeeded in constructing genuinely alternative life forms 
because such artificial systems, if exhibiting...properties others [sic] than 
those known from life on Earth, could be said to be alive only by 
definition: they would not be found to be alive but declared to be alive. 
Hence...it is not just ‘extremely difficult’ to distinguish universal 
properties of biosystems (as they could be) from those common to life on 
our planet: it is de facto impossible. [emphasis original] 
 
A full treatment of this problem is too lengthy and tangential for my purpose here5, but I 
agree with the spirit of their critique. It is motivated by the picture of life currently 
                                            
5 The main reason for it being tangential is that it involves discussion of how to treat man-made objects 
exhibiting high-level characteristics. It is virtually impossible for complex life forms, such as a proposed 
intelligent computer, to spring into existence without passing first through some evolutionary pathway 
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available to us which, given the way life has developed on Earth, of course exhibits 
particular commonalities. It is only by observing these commonalities and generalizing 
from them that we are able to suggest definitions for life in the first place. But if we were 
to observe not a fundamental aspect of life but an advanced feature, such as apparent 
consciousness, we would be justified in at least suspecting the presence of life, 
regardless of the details of the entity itself. In other words, the definition of biosystem 
given by Mahner and Bunge only dictates a minimum requirement (which is couched, no 
less, in the language of life particular to Earth); we can easily imagine other sufficient 
(but not necessary) features which could also indicate life. In their conclusion they 
assent to the idea that extraterrestrial life may exist that would very likely differ 
drastically from Earth’s life forms, though they remain unwilling to extend the same 
consideration to terrestrial artificial life, calling it as a project a “waste of energy, time, 
and money” (Mahner and Bunge, 1997, p. 153). However, given our current level of 
technology (and the rapid pace of its increase), it seems unfair to rule out entirely the 
future creation of some entity that perhaps exhibits some higher-level features of life 
while lacking those already identified in this chapter; at that time, we would likely have to 
revise our definitions of life to include, explicitly, higher-level features that we currently 
assume imply the fundamental features we have deemed necessary for life. But as this 
is currently only the domain of science fiction, speculation about the status of 
hypothetical entities seems unlikely to contribute anything of significance to talk about 
the emergence of life. 
                                            
(even indirectly, by considering their creator). It is not clear, therefore, how such cases would be handled 
were they to be found. 
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 Because this thesis is concerned with addressing emergence as it may be 
applied to life, it is therefore necessary not only to understand life—covered in the first 
chapter—but also the philosophical position of emergentism. The next section will begin 
this task by stating and examining the central tenets of emergentism. However, two of 
these tenets will, because of their importance to this thesis, require a greater degree of 
scrutiny. Thus, the third section will cover the topic of reduction by looking at two 
different models, while the fourth section will deal with the causal efficacy of emergent 
properties. My hope is that by examining emergence with respect to its particular tenets, 
rather than as a wholesale doctrine, it will be easy to identify and incorporate points of 
agreement in the next chapter, while allowing for diagnoses of particular problems 






 It is quite common to find in modern philosophical discussions of emergence 
some acknowledgment of its relatively recent rise in popularity. Talk of emergence is not 
limited to philosophical discourse, however; it is used in many different contexts within 
the natural and special sciences to denote a variety of ideas, so that its meaning from 
one context to the next can differ significantly. In order to explore possible connections 
between emergence and life, it will first be necessary to acquire an understanding of 
emergence that respects its historical underpinnings while remedying, if and where 
possible, theoretical missteps both original and more recent. My goal is neither to 
provide a complete review of the literature on emergence nor to develop yet another 
specific brand of emergentism; I will focus instead on presenting what is often taken to 
be the generally received view of emergentism, along with some criticisms, where 
relevant.  
 The best place to begin, I think, is by stating in very rudimentary form the general 
concept of emergence. An excellent formulation of this sort is offered by Jaegwon Kim 
(2006, p. 548), and it introduces and relates several key features of emergentism that 
will discussed at length in the following sections:  
 
the intuitive idea of an emergent property stems from the thought that a 
purely physical system, composed exclusively of bits of matter, when it 
reaches a certain degree of complexity in its structural organization, can 





This “intuitive” formulation of emergentism gives insight into its proponents’ view of how 
the physical world is organized. The degrees of organizational complexity roughly 
correspond to “levels” so that the world is divided up into a hierarchy of these levels. It is 
convenient (though questionable, as we will see) to think of these levels in terms of 
sciences that study them. Thus, at the base of the hierarchy is physics, which studies 
the fundamental constituents of matter and the ways in which they interact with each 
other. Physics, like other sciences, is characterized by a set of laws which are thought 
to describe these fundamental interactions. Setting aside the question whether physics 
itself can be divided further, the next tier in the hierarchy is typically taken to be 
chemistry6, though sometimes the base level is described as a hybrid, “physico-
chemical”.  Next up we find biology, after which the structure of the hierarchy becomes 
much less obvious. The relevant point is the supposition that at each tier, and 
presumably for sub-tiers if they exist, properties emerge that somehow go beyond what 
we might expect (hence “novel”) based on our knowledge of the laws of the level below. 
 In order to examine this idea fully, however, we need to find a more complete 
description of just what emergentism claims. For this, too, we can turn to Kim (1999, pp. 
20-22) who summarizes the main tenets of the “received” view of emergentism.7 
 
                                            
6 More accurately, it should be deemed chemical. However, to remain consistent while avoiding confusion 
by calling the base tier “physical”, which also clearly applies to higher tiers as well, I will simply continue to 
use the name of the relevant scientific field to identify the levels. 
7 Though it is never stated explicitly, tenets 3-5 should be seen as necessary features of emergentism. 
And, insofar as there are complex higher-level entities and properties, they should be seen (necessarily) 
as arising according to tenets 1 and 2. 
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(1) Emergence of complex higher-level entities: Systems with a higher-
level of complexity emerge from the coming together of lower-level 
entities in new structural configurations (the new “relatedness” of these 
entities). 
 
(2) Emergence of higher-level properties: All properties of higher-level 
entities arise out of the properties and relations that characterize their 
constituent parts. some properties of these higher, complex systems are 
“emergent”, and the rest merely “resultant”. 
 
(3) The unpredictability of emergent properties: Emergent properties are 
not predictable from exhaustive information concerning their “basal” 
conditions”. In contrast, resultant properties are predictable from lower-
level information. 
 
(4) The unexplainability/irreducibility of emergent properties: Emergent 
properties, unlike those that are merely resultant, are neither explainable 
nor reducible in terms of their basal conditions. 
 
(5) The causal efficacy of the emergents: Emergent properties have 
causal powers of their own—novel causal powers irreducible to the 





In addition to clarifying the emergentist doctrine, Kim’s tenets also introduce several 
new ideas. We have seen points (1) and (2) in the intuitive formulation, but (3)-(5) add 
the requirements of unpredictability, irreducibility, and causal efficacy. Points (4) and (5) 
will be given their own sections, so for now we can focus on addressing points (1)-(3). 
 The idea that complex higher-level entities emerge from certain configurations of 
lower level entities is one of the oldest ideas in emergentism. There are many examples 
of this sort of emergence, from Broad’s (1925) own atoms-to-compound-molecules, to, 
perhaps, organisms from cells, and so on. As Kim (1999, p. 20) notes, this idea is hardly 
unique to emergentism, and it is not until we consider the properties of these entities 
that we move into the realm of emergence. An important distinction must be made when 
we consider such properties. Emergentists distinguish between two kinds: resultant 
properties and emergent properties. An example, adapted from Kim (1999, pp. 25-26), 
involving mass can be used to gain an idea of what is being said in this distinction. 
Consider an atom of iron. It has certain properties, one of which is its mass. A 1 
kilogram hunk of iron has a great many iron atoms in it, such that the overall mass is 1 
kilogram. Though none of the individual atoms have the property of having a mass of 1 
kilogram, the hunk itself does, and as such it is able to exert particular causal powers, 
like acting as a brutish paper weight. But despite the fact that none of its constituent 
parts (atoms) share the property of having a mass of 1 kilogram, “emergentists would 
not consider mass an emergent property; they would say that the mass of an object is a 
resultant property, a property that is merely ‘additive or subtractive’.”   
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 The difference between resultant and emergent properties is often characterized 
by the “novelty” of the latter properties:  
 
The concept of emergence was dealt with (to go no further back) by J.S. 
Mill…The word ‘emergent’, as contrasted with ‘resultant’, was suggested 
by G.H. Lewes…Both adduce examples from chemistry and from 
physiology; both deal with properties; both distinguish those properties 
(a) which are additive and subtractive only, and predictable, from those 
(b) which are new and unpredictable. (Morgan, quoted from Kim, 1999, 
p. 5) 
 
Because we are interested in the properties picked out by (b) in the above quotation, we 
must explore what is meant by “new and unpredictable”. Kim suggests that the 
unpredictability is the source of the novelty, so long as we are concerned only with the 
right kind of predictability. He identifies two types of predictability—inductive and 
theoretical—and insists that it is the latter which emergentists deny. Of the former, he 
says 
 
Even emergent properties are inductively predictable: Having observed 
that an emergent property, E, emerged whenever any system 
instantiated a microstructural property M, we may predict that this 
particular system will instantiate E at t, given our knowledge or belief that 
it will instantiate, M, at t [endnote excluded]. More generally, on the basis 
of such empirical data we may have a well-confirmed “emergence law” 
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to the effect that whenever a system instantiates basal condition M it 
instantiates an emergent E.  
 
The notion that emergent properties are inductively predictable is something with which 
everyone is familiar; if we take the example of consciousness as an emergent property 
of a certain biological microstructural configuration (the brain), we assume that because 
all humans have brains they must have some form of consciousness. This type of 
prediction is closely tied to the notion of supervenience, which says that  
 
If property M emerges from properties N1,…,Nn, then M supervenes on 
N1,…,Nn. That is to say, systems that are alike in respect of basal 
conditions, N1,…,Nn must be alike in respect of their emergent 
properties. (Kim, 2006, p. 550). 
 
Supervenience is often considered an integral component of emergence, as it relates in 
a deterministic way basal properties and emergent properties (Kim, 2006). But could we 
predict, for example, consciousness in the absence of experience, by examination of the 
physical constituents (and their arrangement) alone? It seems exceedingly unlikely, for 
we would lack even the theoretical concepts necessary to generate such a prediction. 
We can strive to replicate something like consciousness based on the inductive 
prediction that certain complex systems of the kind we have already observed will 
exhibit consciousness—this is the goal of the strong AI programme—but we cannot, if 





 The irreducibility of emergent properties is a key tenet of emergentism because it 
grants special status to each level in the hierarchy. The sciences that describe the laws 
and explain the phenomena of these levels are not simply convenient macroscopic 
descriptions that reduce down to the basal domain of physics on close inspection. By 
contrast, the goal of reductivism is to provide explanations consisting only of basal laws 
and the constituents they govern. 
 I will cover two kinds of reductionism in this section. The first approach is often 
called Nagelian or classical (theory) reduction, so named for its most influential 
contributor Ernest Nagel, though I will include Fodor’s (1974) characterization here. The 
second approach, developed by Kim (1999; 2006) is a more recent and unique 
formulation that we can call the functional model of reduction. Ultimately I will proceed 
by using Kim’s method of reduction, both for its relative simplicity and its self-contained 
nature; it is well beyond the scope of this work to synthesize the many responses to 
Nagel’s (and even Fodor’s) original position before applying the result to biology. 
Instead, by using Kim’s proposal for reduction, a comprehensive recounting of it can be 
given here, and it can readily be applied to the problem motivating this entire thesis. 
However, it is still worthwhile to consider the classical view, both for completeness and 








The basic idea behind classical reduction is that higher-level theories can be reduced to 
lower-level (more basic) theories by making use of bridge laws. They act in the following 
way, as illustrated by Fodor (1974, p. 98). We start with a given law of a particular 
special science8 S and denote the relation as  
 
(1) S1x ➝ S2x 
 
which Fodor instructs us to read as “all S1 situations bring about S2 situations”. In order 
to reduce this special science law to physics, we require a means of relating both S1x 
and S2x to their respective situations in physics. This is particularly necessary (and 
almost always the case) when terms in science to be reduced do not occur in physics. 
We can write these relations 
 
(2a) S1x ⇆ P2x 
(2b) S2x ⇆ P2x 
(3) P1x ➝ P2x 
 
                                            
8 It is unclear what exactly counts as a “special science”. Here I will take it to mean any science that is not 
a part of physics proper (i.e., chemistry, biology, and so on). Whether Fodor intended the other natural 
sciences to be included is not explicitly clear, but his insistence on the transitivity of bridge laws seems to 
clear the way for counting as a special science any non-physics science. 
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Here P1 and P2 are predicates in physics, while S1 and S2 are predicates of the special 
science. Unlike (1) and (3), the bridge laws contain predicates of both physics and the 
special science; thus, “the reduction of a science requires that any formula which 
appears as the antecedent or consequent of one of its proper laws must appear as the 
reduced formula in some bridge law or other” (Fodor, 1974, p. 98). Fodor suggests that 
the bridge laws express event identities, so that (2a), for example, reads as roughly 
“every event which consists of x’s satisfying S1 is identical to some event which consists 
of x’s satisfying P1 and vice versa” (Fodor, 1974, p. 100). The doctrine entailed by this 
reading of bridge laws he calls token physicalism, which is “simply the claim that all the 
events that the sciences talk about are physical events” (Fodor, 1974, p. 100). To get to 
reductivism, we must add to token physicalism the “assumption that there are natural 
kind predicates in an ideally completed physics which correspond to each natural kind 
predicate in an ideally completed special science” (Fodor, 1974, p. 100). Fodor 
encourages us to accept token physicalism but deny reductivism, on the basis that it 
seems unlikely that there is the correct correspondence between the natural kinds of the 
respective sciences. Nonetheless, he offers the following summary: 
 
reductivism entails the generality of physics in at least the sense that 
any event which falls within the universe of discourse of a special 
science will also fall within the universe of discourse of physics. 
Moreover, any prediction which follows from the laws of a special 
science and a statement of initial conditions will also follow from a theory 
which consists of physics and the bridge laws, together with the 
 
 40 
statement of initial conditions. Finally, since ‘reduces to’ is supposed to 
be an asymmetric relation, it will also turn out that physics is the basic 
science; that is, if reductivism is true, physics is the only science that is 
general in the sense just specified. (p. 101). 
 
  
There are problems with classical reduction, and more recent work has been focused on 
addressing them. Some corrected accounts are covered briefly in Batterman (2004), 
but, having only skimmed the surface of the vast literature on this type of reduction, I will 
set it aside in favor of the novel approach of Kim. At the end of this section I will offer 
some insight into why Kim’s is the preferred model for application to the topic of this 
thesis. 
 
Functional Model of Reduction 
 Kim’s (1998; 1999) model is motivated by three crucial questions to which he 
feels his model, unlike the classical model, is able to provide satisfactory answers.  
 
(1) Explanatory: why does this system exhibit E at t? 
(2) Predictive: Will this system exhibit E at time t? Can we predict this from knowledge 
of what goes on in the base domain? 
(3) Ontological: In what sense is the functional model a model of reduction? What does 




The model itself veers away from the classical bridge laws, instead reducing a property 
to its reduction base by means of a three-step process. The first step is to functionalize 
the candidate property; once this is accomplished, we search for the realizers of this 
property in the basal level; finally, having identified a realizer (or several realizers), we 
find a theory at the basal level that explains how these realizers cause the property in 
question. Upon achieving the goal of the third step, the reduction is complete. With so 
much time and effort invested into the classical model since its inception, one may 
rightly be wary of Kim’s seemingly simple approach; however, Kim’s example, along 
with further explication of the steps, helps to clarify exactly how and why this unique 
approach to reduction works. 
 As in classical reduction, Kim’s model is ultimately a step-wise process. The 
reduction base may not initially be the most general base possible; further reduction is 
necessary following the same steps in order to reach the level of fundamental physics. 
The reduction base, B, consists of the “basal conditions for our emergent properties”, 
from which property E is proposed to have emerged. The goal is to reduce E to B, 
though, as noted, further reduction may be desired. The first step required for this 
reduction is the functionalization of E: 
 
Step 1:  E must be functionalized - that is, E must be construed, or 
reconstructed, as a property defined by its causal/nomic 
relations to other properties, specifically properties in the 





E is functionally defined over B as: 
 
Having E =def Having some property P in B such that (i) C1,…,Cn cause 
P to be instantiated, and (ii) P causes F1,…, Fm to be instantiated. (We 
allow either (i) or (ii) to be empty.) 
 
Any property P in B that meets (i) and (ii) is a “‘realizer’ or ‘implementer’ of E” (Kim, 
1999, p. 11). In functionalizing E, we are “establishing a conceptual/definitional 
connection for E and the selected causal role”, and thus we should include empirical 
knowledge about E and its causal/nomic relations. Having functionalized E, we can 
move to the next step: 
 
Step 2: Find realizers of E in B. If the reduction, or reductive explanation, 
of a particular instance of E in a given system is wanted, find the 
particular realizing property P in virtue of which E is instantiated on this 
occasion in the system; similarly, for classes of systems belonging to the 
same species or structure types. (Kim, 1999, p. 11). 
 
Here the challenge is empirical (scientific). Kim uses the example of a gene to illustrate 
this point: to reduce the property of being a gene (genetics) to a property of DNA 
(molecular biology), we must first functionalize the gene. The causal function of a gene 
can be roughly construed as the transmission of heritable information to offspring. 
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However, in order to find the realizer of this property, much scientific legwork needed to 
be done. DNA happens to be the modern realizer, although this may not always have 
been true. Fortunately, Kim’s model can accommodate multiple realizers, a point which 
will facilitate its application to life in the next chapter. The final step in Kim’s model is to 
identify a theory that explains how E works. Specifically,  
 
Step 3: Find a theory (at the level of B) that explains how realizers of E 
perform the causal task that is constitutive of E (i.e., the causal role 
specified in Step 1). Such a theory may also explain other significant 
causal/nomic relations in which E plays a role. 
 
If we are seeking a reduction of the gene to the level of molecular biology, we need to 
find a theory at the level of molecular biology that explains how DNA is able to 
accomplish its causal function. Typically, as Kim notes, “ascertaining realizers of E will 
almost certainly involve theories about causal/nomic interrelations among lower-level 
properties in the base domain” (Kim, 1999, p. 12). Once we have identified the realizer 
and are in possession of a theory at the basal level that explains the causal function of 
the realizer,  we have on Kim’s account successfully reduced the target property to its 
reduction base.  
 Returning to Kim’s motivating questions, we have seen already how to answer 
the first. The system has a property with a particular causal role, and for which there is a 
specific realizer and an accompanying theory as to how that realizer works. To answer 
the second question, we need only look for the realizers of E at the basal level. 
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Recalling the example of the gene, once the gene had been functionalized, the scientific 
problem could be recast at the basal level. The search for the particular molecular 
realizer of the causal function of the gene could be conducted “solely on the basis of 
knowledge of the causal/nomic relations obtaining” at the molecular level (Kim, 1999, p. 
14). And once DNA was found, we were able to predict, based on its presence or 
absence, which systems would have heritable transmission (though the details of 
heredity, such as gene expression, are another matter). 
 The final, ontological question provokes a two-fold answer from Kim. First, he 
suggests that because each instance of E is directly tied to a realizer of E, there is 
nothing above and beyond the instances of the realizer. Because there are potentially 
many realizers of E—such as DNA, RNA, and so on—we can identify and group 
together all instances which possess the same causal powers. Kim calls this the causal 
inheritance principle, and formally it reads: 
 
If a functional property E is instantiated on a given occasion in virtue of 
one of its realizers, Q, being instantiated, then the causal powers of this 
instance of E are identical with the causal powers of this instance of Q. 
(Kim, 1999, p. 16). 
 
If one grants this, then the E- and Q-instances are effectively identical, and thus all E-
instances reduce to Q-instances.  
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 The second part of Kim’s answer to the ontological question concerns the 
reduction of the property E itself, especially in light of there possibly being multiple 
realizers of E. He lists three approaches: 
 
First, one may choose to defend E as a legitimate higher-level property 
irreducible to its realizers, the Q’s…. 
 
Second, one may choose to identify E with the disjunction of its 
realizers…. Notice, though, that this identity is not necessary—it does 
not hold in every possible world—since whether or not a property 
realizes E depends on the laws that prevail at a given world. 
 
Third, we may give up E as a genuine property and only recognize the 
expression E or the concept E. As it turns out, many different properties 
are picked out by the concept E, depending on the circumstances—the 
kind of structures involved and the nomological nature of the world 
under construction. 
 
The first approach is essentially that of emergentists since the irreducibility of emergent 
properties to some basal level is a key tenet of emergentism. A longer passage makes 
clear Kim’s stance with respect to the second and third approaches; it will also factor 




[I]f the “multiplicity” or “diversity” of realizers means anything, it must 
mean that these realizers are causally and nomologically diverse. 
Unless two realizers of E show significant causal/nomological diversity, 
there is no clear reason why we should count them as two, not one. It 
follows then that multiply realizable properties are ipso facto causally 
and nomologically heterogeneous. This is especially obvious when one 
reflects on the causal inheritance principle. All this points to the 
inescapable conclusion that E, because of its causal/nomic 
heterogeneity, is unfit to figure in laws, and is thereby disqualified as a 
useful scientific property [emphasis mine]. On this approach, then, one 
could protect E, but not as a property with a role in scientific laws and 
explanations [emphasis mine]. You could insist on the genuine 
propertyhood of E as much as you like, but the victory would be empty. 
The conclusion, therefore, has to be this: as a significant scientific 
property, E has been reduced—eliminatively. (Kim, 1999, pp. 18-19). 
 
 Kim’s model of reduction is clearly distinct from classical reduction. Additionally, 
as demonstrated by the example of the gene, it is not excessively unwieldy. It can be 
readily applied, though the result, as noted by Batterman (2004, p. 70) is “species—or 
structure—specific”. Thus we have “reductions of human psychology to human 
physiology (and ultimately to physics) and reductions of reptilian ‘psychology’ to reptilian 
physiology (and ultimately to physics). We do not, however, have a reduction of 
psychology to physics.” Yet this should not be troubling, unless, like Fodor, one wishes 
to maintain dogmatically the independence of higher-level scientific disciplines from 
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physics. Attempts at wholesale reduction are, due to the sheer size of the task, almost 
certainly doomed to fail. Instead, given the complex and interwoven nature of all the 
material grouped together under broad headings like psychology, piece-wise reduction 
seems much more likely to succeed.    
 
 In addressing why Kim’s model is preferred over the classical model, I am not 
sure that a sufficiently strong answer can be given that would satisfy opponents of 
reductivism, but all the same I will give my reasons. The primary motivation is the 
immense difficulty involved in formulating the necessary bridge laws of the classical 
model. Recall that for reduction to take place under the classical model the higher-level 
sciences must relate to the lower-level sciences via laws that translate the (scientific) 
predicates of one into the other. This is a particular problem when the sciences do not 
share the same terminology, such as—to take a drastic example—the reduction of 
psychology to physics. The actual path may be indirect, moving from psychology to 
neuropsychology, neurology, biochemistry, and so on, down to physics, but 
terminological problems still abound. Each step is laborious to formulate and requires 
intricate knowledge of not only the laws of each level but also a considerable 
understanding of how they can be translated. It seems to me that we lack that required 
understanding, which is also, ironically, on par with the level of knowledge necessary to 
declare the existence of emergents in that particular domain. Put differently, if we know 
the details of how higher-level laws can be related to lower-level laws, we should also 
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know whether such a reduction is possible. And, in knowing this, we would already be 
able to ascertain the existence of any possible emergents.  
 Kim’s model relaxes these constraints, but not so much as to be useless. The 
example of the gene, though simplistic, indicates how reduction can begin even in cases 
where certain theoretical knowledge is lacking. We could have, in principle, 
functionalized the gene as soon as it was conceptualized as the unit of inheritance, 
though we would have had to wait a long time for its realizer and accompanying theory 
to be found. Importantly, however, we do not need to know precisely how the language 
of genetics can be mapped on to molecular biology; we only need to understand the 
causal/nomic role played by that which we are functionalizing. Because there is no 
universal agreement on a concise definition of life (or even whether such a definition is 
possible or useful), I think it makes sense to employ the model that better 
accommodates—through functionalization—the spirit of the project, rather than the 
letter. The correspondence of scientific finding to the functionalized emergent, provided 
by the second and third steps of Kim’s model, is left to decide the success or failure of 
the reduction. 
 The allowance of multiple realizability is another reason to adopt Kim’s model. 
We will see in the next chapter that life is multiply realized, but the permissibility of 
multiple realizability in the classical model has been called into question by some, most 
notably Fodor (1974). Fodor believes that while the laws that hold within the sciences 
themselves are true laws, the bridge laws used to reduce the special sciences are not. 
Batterman (2004) gives an example to demonstrate this, which he attributes to Kim. He 
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begins by stating a hypothetical law, that “all jade is green”, and asks whether it can be 
reduced to the level of its chemical realizers. There are two physical realizers of jade 
(jadeite and nephrite) and they are distinct physical kinds (Batterman, 2004, p. 65). But 
“because the microstructures of jadeite and nephrite are completely distinct and 
heterogeneous from the point of view of the lower level theory, this bridge law cannot 
express coextensivity of a natural kind term of the jade theory with a natural kind term of 
the lower level chemical theory” (Batterman, 2004, p. 66). Since laws should relate 
natural kinds to natural kinds, and since a disjunction of natural kinds (e.g. jadeite or 
nephrite) is not also a natural kind, bridge laws cannot be natural kinds.9 Kim suggests 
that the way out of this problem is to accept a reduction of jade to distinct instances of 
jadeite and nephrite, and in so doing dispense with the idea of higher-level laws of 
science10. So while Kim and Fodor are at odds over reductivism—with Kim arguing for, 
and Fodor arguing against—both agree that multiple realizability presents a significant 
problem for the classical model’s bridge laws. This problem was, at least in part, 
responsible for Kim’s development of the functional model, and thus I think it is 
reasonable to use this model as the means of reducing life to the molecular level.  
 
 
                                            
9 Fodor (1974, p. 102) admits that there may well be irresolvable discrepancies in how people 
conceptualize natural kinds and laws. 
10 His argument is of course much more detailed and elaborate, but this is his general conclusion. 
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2.4 Directional Causation 
 
 We have now covered the first four tenets of emergentism outlined by Kim. The 
first two tenets, pertaining to the emergence of complex entities and properties, can be 
intuitively grasped; explication was required, however, to show that emergent properties 
should be neither theoretically predictable nor reducible, as necessitated by the third 
and fourth tenets. This section deals with the final tenet, the causal efficacy of emergent 
properties, and in particular their required direction of causation. 
 Most accounts of emergentism insist that the properties that emerge have causal 
powers distinct from the causal powers of their basal conditions. Examination of these 
novel causal powers leads to a potentially problematic discovery, namely, that there 
appears to be downward causation. First, though, what does it mean to say that 
something has downward causation? We have already granted that properties emerge 
from an emergent base, since emergence is dependent on the complex structural 
configuration of higher-level entities and their properties (tenets (1) and (2) of 
emergentism). For that emergent base then there is always an emergent property that is 
instantiated whenever those basal properties are present—this is simply supervenience. 
If we want to say that an emergent property has novel causal powers, we must be 
saying something about the emergent property’s ability to cause same-level properties. 
(The reason we do not need to consider higher-level causation is that the higher level 
would necessarily have basal properties that must be caused in order for the higher-
level property to be caused.) Accordingly, each of these emergent-level properties must 
have respective basal physical properties upon which they supervene. But because 
 
 51 
each emergent property’s base must be present for the emergent property to be 
present, it follows that to say that the emergent property caused another emergent 
property is to say that it caused the second property’s basal properties, which in turn 
caused the emergence of the second property. And this is downward causation, from 
higher level to basal level. In practice, this amounts to saying that, for example, 
consciousness exhibits downward causation by altering the world at the physical level 
(Kim, 2006).  
 The problem that arises should already be evident in the above description of 
downward causation. If one emergent property causes another, or more precisely if one 
causes the emergent base of another, and has its own emergent base (as it must), then 
why can’t we simply say that the first emergent base caused the second? Why do we 
need to talk about emergent properties at all? Kim (2006, p. 558) uses the association 
of pain and neural states to illustrate: “there is little to recommend in the claim that a 
neural state causes pain and then pain in turn causes, say, my hand withdrawal. How 
can there be a causal chain from pain to the hand motion that is separate and 
independent from the physical causal chain from the neural state to the motion of the 
hand?” And because we are nomologically required to accept the first set of basal 
properties as a cause of the second, if we insist on including as an additional cause the 
emergent property caused by the first set of basal properties the result is causal 
overdetermination. This puts emergentism in a difficult position: “if there is systematic 
causal overdetermination in all cases of downward causation, emergents cannot fulfill 
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their causal promise; anything they causally contribute can be, and is, contributed by a 
physical cause….If downward causation goes, so goes emergentism” (Kim, 2006, 558).  
 Thus, while downward causation is not itself an incoherent idea, it poses a 
difficult problem for emergentism. Kim (1999; 2006) insists that there has not yet been 
an acceptable solution found by emergentists, and this leaves emergence on tenuous 
footing: on one hand, it must accept (and indeed is predicated on) the notion of 
downward causation; on the other, downward causation seems to preclude the 
properties that are proposed to have emerged from having any real causal value. Kim 
(1999) suggests that there may be value in retaining a conceptual interpretation of 
downward causation that leaves intact the representational features of the higher-level 
sciences, such as their concepts and descriptions. This would allow for “a single causal 
relation [to be] describable in different languages”—that is, the languages of the 
different sciences (Kim, 1999, p. 33).  
  
 Stepping back, from considerations found above there are at least two ways in 
which emergentism may be undermined. First, if any property is reducible to its basal 
level, it is not emergent but must instead be resultant. I suspect most emergentists will 
readily grant this, as they are unlikely to insist on the impossibility of reduction 
simpliciter. However, broad claims of the reducibility of all special sciences to physics 
greatly restricts the domain of possible emergents, leaving in many cases emergents 
only as epiphenomenal features with little or no explanatory value.  
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 The second way in which emergentism may be undermined is the already-
discussed problem of downward causation. Unlike reduction, downward causation is a 
general and deeply-rooted concern for emergentists. Some properties may be reducible 
while others are not, and thus there is still room available for emergence; but, if the 
argument against downward causation holds, it is unclear how any account of 
emergence can proceed without first accounting for how the proposed emergents are 
able to exert their causal powers.  
 The goal of the next chapter is not to provide a decisive argument against 
emergentism as a doctrine—if it were, I would likely employ the problem of downward 
causation. I want to grant that perhaps there is a solution, and that some clever 
accounts of emergence may posit a means of causal efficacy that circumvents this 
particular problem. My focus will instead be on a reduction of life to a basal level, which, 
while leaving open the door open for other emergent properties, will if successful 
demonstrate that life is not emergent.
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 In this chapter, I will mesh the topics covered in the previous chapters to show 
that life is not, in fact, emergent. The next section will be concerned with eliminating a 
possible ambiguity of terminology when talking about emergence and life that may arise 
as a result of the proliferation of “emergence talk” in scientific literature. It will be 
important to distinguish this type of emergence from the stricter form employed in this 
thesis to prevent both confusion and claims of triviality. The third section details my 
argument against the emergence of life. I focus on two points: the reducibility of life to 
the molecular level via Kim’s functional model of reduction, and life’s apparent lack of 
novel causal powers. I will also briefly suggest that in denying the emergence of life I am 
not also denying the possibility of emergent properties arising as a result of life. The 
final section will handle some objections to my argument, namely the problem posed by 
forms of emergence that differ from the one outlined in this thesis, and the claim that 






3.2 Emergence Everywhere 
 
We now see the term [emergence] freely bandied about, especially by 
some scientists and science writers, with little visible regard for whether 
its use is underpinned by a consistent, tolerably unified, and shared 
meaning (and if so what it is). This has created situations in which those 
discussing emergence, even face to face, more often than not talk past 
each other. Sometimes one gets the impression that the only thing the 
participants share is the word “emergence”. The intuitive associations 
this word evokes in us do not add up to a concept robust enough to do 
any useful work, or even to serve as helpful constraints on a theoretical 
account of construction of the concept. “Emergence” is very much a term 
of philosophical trade; it can pretty much mean whatever you want it to 
mean, the only condition being that you had better be reasonably clear 
about what you mean, and that your concept turns out to be something 
interesting and theoretically useful. (Kim, 2006, p. 548). 
 
 Kim’s remarks indicate the existence of a very real problem when attempting to 
examine the proposed emergence of a particular entity or property. In this section I want 
to identify and differentiate a common usage of the term “emergence”, found throughout 
scientific literature on life and its origins, from the kind of emergence that was the topic 
of the previous chapter. If one reads the relevant scientific literature, a sense of certainty 
is gained that might lead one to suppose that the emergence of life is old news, 
something shown to be true long ago and subsequently adopted into scientific canon. 
But, as Kim astutely observed, emergence used in this context is almost always taken 
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for granted, and almost never scrutinized; it is a stepping stone on the path to other 
arguments, hardly worthy of closer inspection.  This has the effect of leaving readers to 
intuit their own meaning of emergence, and I suspect that quite often this meaning is 
simply something like “appeared”—the context rarely requires anything more.  
 There is, to be sure, a trivial sense of emergence which need not be argued for, 
when used, for example, in the statement, “At some point in Earth’s history, life 
emerged.” Here “emergence” often does just mean “appeared”, and since presumably 
there was a time in Earth’s history when no life existed, life must have, at some later 
time, formed. This kind of emergence, however, is clearly not the same as the kind 
discussed in the previous chapter. Recall that to say something is emergent is to say a 
good deal about that entity or property: it is complex, has (at least one) basal level from 
which it emerged, and it possesses novel properties with novel causal powers. That is 
well beyond what is being claimed by saying that between two distinct times something 
came into existence that did not previously exist. 
 Trivial emergence does not seem to be what most biologists have in mind when 
they talk about life. Those who view life as emergent want to assert something about 
life, that is, they want to go beyond the simple fact that life exists. But despite 
recognizing—in a vague sense, if nothing more—the philosophical overtones of 
emergence, most authors do not in practice adhere to a robust notion of emergence of 
the sort outlined in the previous chapter. An excellent example of this comes from 
Morowitz’s (2002) The Emergence of Everything. Morowitz sketches 28 instances of 
emergence that he feels to be of particular importance in the history of the universe. His 
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selected examples range from “The primordium” to stars, cells, primates, agriculture, 
and philosophy itself. We can be sympathetic to his project—identifying specific 
instances of emergence—since producing even a single conclusive example of an 
emergent would be groundbreaking. Furthermore, his is a reasonable approach to 
finding emergents: start at the most basic level (the origin of the universe) and, with the 
benefit of hindsight, search for higher-level entities that seem to resist explanation at the 
level of their constituents.  
 Unfortunately, a cursory glance at the cases he includes indicates that something 
is likely wrong with his conclusions (and, consequently, with his concept of emergence). 
An introductory chapter acquaints the reader with a brief, somewhat curious history of 
emergence as philosophical notion. Morowitz mentions most of the requisite features of 
emergence discussed already in this thesis, such as complexity, irreducibility, and 
novelty, though causal efficacy is notably absent. However, once he moves on to the 
instances themselves, it seems as if the details of emergence are lost, replaced by a 
version of emergence that is neither trivial nor rigorous but instead somewhere in the 
middle. We see this, for example, in his take on the emergence of planetary accretion. 
He concludes that particular chapter with the statement, “The emergence of planets in 
any case is part of the process of star formation, surrounding the stars with potential 
abodes for life. The rules with which they emerge are pointing to higher degrees of 





There is little to suggest that any principles beyond thermodynamics, 
physical chemistry, and mechanics are required to understand the 
structure formation of the Earth shells, but nevertheless some details of 
Earth formation are still lacking…. Even when the reductionist principles 
are thoroughly understood, the complexity of the unfolding leaves us 
with much to understand. This provides another role of emergence as a 
tool in understanding our world…. The bottom line is that the emergent 
planet is complex, both structurally and kinetically…. Understanding the 
structure of the Earth seems to lie within the domain of normal physics 
and chemistry. It is, however, clearly a problem of great complexity and 
great difficulty (Morowitz, 2002, pp. 64-66).  
 
In each case, his usage of “emergence” is entirely consistent with roughly meaning only 
that there is a trend towards increasing complexity. This is certainly a trend he intends 
to convey, as the examples (chapters) are arranged chronologically to demonstrate that 
complexity increases with time, building on the (complexity of the) configuration of the 
level from which it emerges. But he quite clearly violates a basic tenet—irreducibility—of 
emergentism in stating that the emergent can be understood, though with difficulty, at a 
basal level. We could charitably interpret this as a slip on Morowitz’s part, but I think it it 
is more profitably conceived as insight into the extent to which he intends the term 
“emergence” to apply.  
 Marshaling sufficient evidence for a particular claim of emergence is an 
exceedingly difficult task, even if one is only concerned with what appear to be 
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straightforward physical events11. Morowitz’s early topics are of this sort, just as one 
might expect in a universe that is becoming increasingly complex with time. The 
progression moves from the inception of the universe through to stellar formation, 
planetary accretion, geosphere formation, and so on. It is generally accepted that these 
events have unfolded according to what are now fairly well understood physical laws, 
making claims of emergence difficult to defend since such claims imply the inability of 
physics to explain adequately the higher-level features. However, if one is primarily 
concerned only with showing increasing complexity, combined with acknowledgment of 
the “novelty” of the entities that arise (without careful consideration of whether the 
entities are merely resultant), the amount of supporting evidence needed is lessened 
considerably. And, I think, it is only by recourse to this simplified version of emergence 
that the task of defending the emergence of later topics, such as agriculture and 
philosophy, are possible at all. His discussion of the emergence of mammals effectively 
illustrates this point. If we think of emergence only as representing an increase in 
complexity with an end-product that did not exist previously, the transition from reptile to 
mammal could reasonably be described as emergence. But to label this evolutionary 
path truly emergent, it would need to be shown, for example, that the emergence of 
mammals is neither explainable at, nor reducible to, some basal level (presumably 
reptiles?). Additionally, mammals would need to possess novel causal powers capable, 
though its meaning in this context becomes obscure. Instead, an overview of Morowitz’s 
chosen cases of emergence looks more like a series of increasingly complex events 
with complex explanations that are perhaps most easily described using higher-level 
                                            
11 Batterman’s (2004) discussion of emergence with respect to rainbows is instructive on this point. 
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concepts that do not readily map onto lower-level concepts. What he seems to identify 
as emergents are often just resultants, and it is only in a strained, weak sense that we 
can consider something like spirituality or philosophy to be emergent. 
  
 There are many sophisticated accounts of emergence in scientific writing, 
accounts which in ascribing emergence to some property or feature of the world invoke 
something very much like what I have called a robust notion of emergence. P.W. 
Anderson’s (1972) article More is Different is one such piece in which a stronger version 
of emergence—more robust than Morowitz’s emergence, and less than Kim’s 
formulation—is used. Anderson insists that though we may be justified in accepting 
reductionist hypotheses, we are not therefore entitled to assume that these hypotheses 
are also “constructionist”: “The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws 
does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe”  
(Anderson, 1972, p. 393).  Anderson uses detailed examples of broken symmetry in 
many-bodied physical systems to show that at each level in the natural structural 
hierarchy “entirely new laws, concepts, and generalizations are necessary” (p. 393). 
Whether one agrees with his conclusions or not it is readily apparent that the kind of 
emergence he has in mind involves more than just increasing complexity. One particular 
point of interest in his belief in the reductionist programme, since that seems to defy 
conventional emergentist thinking. However, close inspection shows that while he 
accepts reductionism, he still insists that there remains some amount of inscrutability 
when viewing the world through reduced theories. Theoretical inexplicability (or perhaps 
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inapplicability) of entities and relations using lower-level theories, despite admission of 
the possibility of reduction, is an interesting and complicated notion. And while it may be 
somewhat at odds with the received view of emergence, it exemplifies a deeper, more 
robust form of emergence that calls attention to—rather than glossing over—the 
problem of finding emergents in physical systems.  
 
 Morowitz, Anderson, and others are, of course, free to use “emergence” as they 
see fit. A reading of The Emergence of Everything would likely lead one to believe that 
emergence is an accepted phenomenon in science and philosophy that occurs 
whenever a new, complex entity arises. However, if one wishes to convey something of 
philosophical importance when discussing emergence, one needs to be 1) explicit in its 
meaning, and 2) consistent in its application. The kind of emergence that Morowitz 
insists has happened a great many times through the course of time is, thus, not the 
kind of emergence I have in mind, though Anderson’s emergence is much closer. The 
moral of this section is two-fold: first, we should not simply declare something to be 
emergent on the basis of it being novel and more complex than its constituents (or, 
rather, we can, but at the expense of saying something particularly meaningful); and 
second, we need to be wary of claims in scientific literature about purported emergents. 
Though they abound, the strength of the claim of emergence is contingent on the rigor 
of the author’s definition. Often, as the Morowitz example is intended to show, these 
definitions are simplified formulations that leave out some key features of a robust 
definition. In the arguments to follow, emergence will be taken to imply the five tenets 
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outlined in the previous chapter; thus, complexity is certainly necessary, but there is 
more as well. What will prove particularly important are the points regarding irreducibility 








3.3 Why Life is not Emergent 
 
 
 Finally, the tools are in place to address the primary question of this thesis: is life 
emergent? This is a loose, convenient formulation of the issue, but it will serve to move 
the discussion forward. To begin to answer this question, we need to know two things: 
1) we need an operational definition of life 2) we need to know what it means for 
something to be emergent. The first chapter of this thesis developed the idea that life is 
best understood as the simultaneous possession by an entity of three features 
(cellularization, metabolism, and heredity); furthermore, the most basic unit in which 
these features are found on Earth is the (prokaryotic) cell. The second chapter sorted 
out the main features of emergentism, based on Kim’s five tenets. Of particular 
importance was the idea of irreducibility, and for that reason two models of reduction 
were presented. If a proposed emergent resists reduction, it is a good candidate; on the 
other hand, if the entity or property can be reduced—by appealing to the methods of 
either model presented, or perhaps others—then it cannot be emergent.  
 I believe that Kim’s model of reduction can be employed to show that life is 
reducible to its components, and that the joint possession of these components by an 
entity confers no novel causal powers beyond the causal powers of the basal structure. 
If this assertion is true, life itself does not seem to be emergent; rather, the predicate is 
living merely expresses a resultant property. Let me show why I think this is the case. 
  
 Kim’s method requires first that the property in question be functionalized. He 
used the example of a gene, which was functionalized as, “”the property of having some 
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property (or being a mechanism) that performs a certain causal function, namely that of 
transmitting phenotypic characteristics from parents to offsprings” (Kim, 1999, 10). Can 
we do something similar with life? I think we can, based on the definition of life arrived at 
in the first chapter. It is more complicated than the gene example, because while genes 
have only (roughly) one causal function, there are three for life. The functionalization of 
life looks something like this (using the same structure as for the gene):  
 
Life is the property of having the joint properties that perform certain causal 
functions, namely that of undergoing metabolic reactions, replicating with both 
heredity and variation, and isolating the system from the surrounding environment 
by a selectively permeable barrier.  
 
Is this adequate as a functionalization of life? Kim says that “E’s being instantiated is for 
a certain property P to be instantiated, with this instantiation bearing causal/nomic 
relations to the instantiations of a specified set of properties in the base domain” (Kim, 
1999, p. 11). By substituting into Kim’s generalized comment life in place of E and the 
three properties comprising life in place of P, we seem to be on the right track. For 
example, cellularization (functionalized as the property of isolating the system from the 
surrounding environment by a selectively permeable barrier) can be grasped at the level 
of the components of this barrier. If we wish to label this base domain, it can be 
identified with molecular biology. The constituents of the barrier are, recall, fatty acids, 
sometimes interspersed with membrane proteins, that self-assemble into a spherical 
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formation, effectively closing off the contents of the sphere from the outside. At the 
molecular level—that is, at the level of the constituents of the barrier—certain molecules 
are able to enter the cell, while others are held outside. This serves many purposes, one 
of which is to set up ion concentration gradients, which then further control many 
aspects of cellular homeostasis. Internal cellular (osmotic) pressure can be regulated, 
hormones can selectively enter the cell to trigger or alter gene expression, and so on. At 
the molecular level, the cellular membrane is a hot-spot of activity. And the same can be 
said of the remaining two features of life, each being understood independently at the 
level of molecular biology. 
 The second step is to identify realizers of life. Once again, remember that for life 
to be instantiated, cellularization, heredity, and metabolism must be instantiated. At the 
macroscopic level this is a fairly easy task. Simple observation led to the conclusion that  
humans and animals eat and breathe, procreate, and are differentiated from their 
environment. However, to understand these processes at the level of (what would 
become) molecular biology took many years, and in some respects it is still an ongoing 
project. Furthermore, cells, for example, do not carry out these tasks in the same way 
as macroscopic entities. And insofar as we are concerned with life emerging from non-
living molecules, it is the microbiological level of understanding that is necessary. As we 
might expect, it turns out that there are an immense number of possible realizers of the 
features of life, though this depends to some extent on how one identifies these 
realizers. In the case of the gene, DNA was found to be the realizer, but we do not count 
each DNA molecule as independent in this respect; DNA identifies a type of realizer for 
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the gene (the present one), RNA another, and so on12. Likewise, it seems wrong to 
count each individual as a realizer of the properties of life, since many individuals share 
the same biological processes. It is even unclear whether the line should be drawn at 
different species; for example, there are a universal set of metabolic pathways, passed 
down through evolution, with each species manifesting some particular subset that best 
suits their needs. Many species share the same subset of metabolic pathways. Thus, to 
say that there are 10 million extant species is not to say that there are 10 million 
different realizers of metabolism. And given that the vast majority of extant species are 
unicellular (prokaryotic), the shared means by which they isolate themselves from their 
environment guarantees a considerably lower number of realizers of cellularization. But 
we need not be concerned with the exact number of realizers for each feature; there are 
some realizers, and each can be understood individually. Patterns that arise simply 
make the process of scientific investigation less tedious.  
 The final step is to find a theory, at the basal level, that explains how the realizers 
work. As predicted this goes hand-in-hand with identifying the realizers themselves. It is 
not enough to know only that fatty acid chains make up cellular membranes: we also 
need to know how they do it. With respect to the features of life, we do indeed have the 
required theories at the molecular-biological level. For cellular membranes, we 
understand not only how phospholipids self-assemble to form spherical vesicles, but we 
also understand how concentrations gradients and ATP-powered pumps are used to 
                                            
12 Particular genes are realized by certain configurations of DNA, though in the past they may also have 
been realized by different configurations, or by a different ribonucleotide altogether, such as a certain 
sequence of RNA. Here I am not concerned with particular genes but instead the more broad means of 
inheritance characterized by, say, the entire human genome. 
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allow selective entry to cellular nutrients. There are too many specific functions of 
cellularization to list exhaustively, and perhaps some remain to be discovered, but 
based on our understanding of its current functions it seems reasonable to think that 
whatever new functions are discovered will also be comprehended equally well at the 
molecular level. And we can say the same for the remaining two functions, because we 
know how DNA is able to code and pass along genetic information, and how the 
reactions in the metabolic pathway proceed.  
 With functionalizations of the three features of life in hand, along with 
considerable scientific evidence for there actually being realizers (and theories about 
how those realizers work), we are entitled, according to Kim’s model, to say that life has 
been reduced.  And, as irreducibility is a key tenet of emergentism, a property that can 
be reduced cannot be considered emergent. Therefore, from the point of view of a 
robust form of emergence, requiring (amongst other things) that emergents be 
irreducible, life—characterized by the three necessary features of cellularization, 
metabolism, and heredity—should not be seen as emergent.   
  
 I also expressed my belief that life qua biosystem does not exhibit any novel 
causal powers. I think this is apparent if the reducibility of life is conceded, but it is also 
an independent empirical question. If life is reducible, as I have suggested above, then 
the causal powers of life (and in particular, elementary biosystems, or cells) can be 
understood at the molecular level too. This follows for what we might call “resultant 
causal powers”, as opposed to novel causal powers. A resultant causal power could be 
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something like the paperweight’s ability, mentioned in the previous chapter, to hold 
paper to a desk. Another example, mentioned by Kim (1999) is that of a bird, whose 
individual parts (simplified to consist only of head, wings, and so on) are capable of a 
kind of movement that the individual parts cannot undergo alone. So, if life is reducible 
to the molecular level, and if in doing the reduction we are required to understand the 
features of life at the basal level, then the higher-level features we observe (and which 
we can reduce) are merely resultant. I think this point will be accepted by most 
emergentists, who will choose instead to take issue with the reduction itself. 
 But the empirical question still looms: are there in fact emergent properties? Here 
there seems to be a good deal of room for dispute, for emergents cannot (by definition) 
be explained at, or predicted by knowledge of, their basal level. In scientific 
investigation, one frequently comes up against the limits of current technology or 
theoretical explanation, yet higher level entities and properties clearly exist, and we 
endeavor to understand how they come about. This creates explanatory gaps, gaps 
between the lower levels and the higher levels, and between sub-levels within levels. 
Much hangs on how one interprets these gaps. Emergentists insist that some of these 
gaps are brute fact, and that even a complete understanding of the lower-level science 
will not be sufficient to explain the complex properties and/or entities that emerge. The 
problem is, at what point should science cease investigation and admit emergence as a 
brute fact, rather than holding out for better technology and theoretical or conceptual 
understanding? In the case of life, we seem to understand its processes at the 
molecular level. As an elementary biosystem, we can describe the cell at the cellular 
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level and examine its internal and external interactions, or we can look at the molecular 
picture. But is there any evidence of causal powers that exist at the level of the cell that 
cannot also be explained by our knowledge of its molecular workings? Science, to my 
knowledge, has found no such thing. There are to be sure resultant properties and 
entities, but so far nothing more.  
 If we widen the gap by looking not between the levels represented by cellular and 
molecular biology but instead by setting as the reduction base (bio)physics, the 
reduction becomes immensely more complex. We are required to span a critical divide 
between levels, crossing from the realm of biology into physics. The way forward is not 
entirely dark: some inroads have been made into comprehending biological processes 
at the level of physics. But we are, essentially, left hanging at the steps in Kim’s 
reductive model that require knowledge of the realizers and how they work, because we 
cannot offer a full theory at the physical level to account for complex biological 
interactions.  
 Now, this is precisely what emergentists want to deny. They see this not as an 
inadequacy on the part of science but as a fundamental limit to the explanations of a 
given level (physics in this case). We can and should study the base (physics) and the 
higher-level theory (biology), but we must accept that the former cannot fully explain the 
latter. Yet, to the scientific mind, I think there is something deeply unsettling about the 
suggestion that there are limits to enquiry and explanation that end in brute facts. 
Developments in biophysics have clearly demonstrated that attempts to understand 
biology through physics are not destined to fail. There appears to be a great deal left to 
 
 70 
understand, and scientists, knowing this, press on. We are, I think, far from possessing 
the level of knowledge necessary to provide full theoretical descriptions at the base 
(physical) level of all things biological, but that same lack of knowledge should caution 
us against declaring too soon the existence of fundamentally inexplicable higher-level 
facts.  
 This seems to be the greater problem when one considers reduction of biology; 
critics of reduction are less concerned with intra-biological reduction, and more 
concerned with the (im)possibility of reducing biology to physics. And while I want to 
acknowledge that it is indeed a tremendous theoretical hurdle, it is too early for 
emergentists to claim victory. Fortunately, by limiting the reduction base to molecular 
biology we are able to say with much greater confidence that there is no remaining way 
in which novel causal powers of cells may be manifested. As a result, we are (inversely) 
proportionately justified in asserting molecular biology’s ability to fully explain 
elementary life. Ideally, once we have the theoretical knowledge required to design  
comprehensive (and exhaustive) searches, the existence of emergents (or lack thereof) 
will be settled decisively by empirical evidence. In the meantime, however, it seems 
unwise to ascribe with any surety emergence to entities and properties that arise from 
somewhere in the gaps of our knowledge. 
  
 Before moving on to objections, I want to insist that I am opposed here only to life 
itself (as elementary biosystems) being considered emergent. Specifically, I do not wish 
to rule out the possibility of emergent properties arising at some point as a result of life. 
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If there are emergent properties at all, first-person conscious experience seems like a 
good candidate (Kim, 1999). Thus, it may be the case that where life develops into 
sufficiently complex organisms, emergent properties arise. Importantly, however, this 
fact, if true, does not require life to be emergent as well. For emergentists who wish to 
maintain life’s emergent nature, they must insist on life emerging from abiotic material. 
Emergence from a collection of non-emergent basal properties is not, then, a foreign 
idea. So, it seems reasonable to assume that whether consciousness is emergent 
depends in no way on life being emergent. The existence of life certainly represents a 
high degree of organizational complexity at the molecular level—this, perhaps, is why 
some people mistakenly assume life to be emergent, by equating emergence with 
complexity, as discussed in the preceding section. But what rises out of this structural 
complexity does not—and maybe cannot, on a strict reading of emergentism’s tenets—









 I do not doubt that any nonreductive physicalist worth her salt would object in 
some way to the preceding line of argument. Batterman (2004, p. 70) suggests that this 
may simply amount to a digging in of one’s heels in resistance to any form of reduction 
based on the desire to “maintain orthodoxy expressed by the label ‘nonreductive 
physicalism’.” However, there are some legitimate concerns that have not yet been 
addressed, and in this section I will attempt to remedy that problem.   
 One obvious problem is already suggested in Anderson’s take on reduction: what 
about emergentists who deny that reduction is a problem while still insisting on the 
existence of emergents? And, for that matter, what about entirely different 
characterizations of emergence? I intended to head off, to some extent, this line of 
objection in the first section where I considered simplistic forms of emergence, 
especially those that essentially equate emergence with increasing complexity. As noted 
there, there is no true consensus on what constitutes emergentism. Kim’s summary of 
the received view is a sort of survey of various forms of emergentism that attempts to 
capture their common features; the five tenets he identifies are not therefore necessarily 
common to all forms of emergentism. The argument provided above for the reduction of 
life to molecular biology according to Kim’s functional model of reduction would certainly 
run into problems if one’s view of emergence did not require irreducibility. This is what 
we find in Anderson’s discussion of emergence, where he accepts reductionism but 
denies that the reductionist programme offers anything constructive. I think there is 
some room here for simply agreeing to disagree about what constitutes an adequate 
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characterization of emergentism, but I think more can be said in this particular case. 
 Anderson’s diagnosis of reductionism failing to offer anything constructive seems 
intuitively correct, but I’m not sure that it does as much work as he hopes. If we take an 
extreme example, it is patently absurd to attempt to explain something like the 
subduction of tectonic plates by appealing to particle physics. Yet we can be a 
reductionist about geophysics, maintaining that tectonic plates can, if we so desired, 
ultimately be reduced down to their atomic underpinnings. Anderson would, I think, 
agree with this too, though he would deny that one could then build the requisite 
theoretical framework from particles back up to plates—this is what his examples of 
broken symmetry are intended to show. The salient point is that whether or not we can 
do this, is it ever desirable to do so? It seems much more likely that, reducible though 
tectonic plates may be, it is considerably more convenient to maintain the concepts of 
geophysics and theories of geophysics with the implicit understanding that those same 
concepts and theories are actually reducible. Why, then, should we expect any 
reductionist programme to be accompanied by a constructionist one? Reductionism in a 
moderate sense is not intended to be eliminative, and conservative reduction (in which 
the concepts and theories are kept) seems perfectly capable of making the necessary 
allowances for the convenience of hierarchical terminology while acknowledging the 
primacy of physics. The need for a constructionist approach is removed if we are always 
allowed to work backwards, starting with higher-level understanding (because it is, for 
example, often computationally more manageable) and progressing towards 
increasingly complex understanding at the basal level, whatever it may be. We do not, 
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however, need to concede (as Anderson insists) that there is an unbridgeable divide in 
the reconstruction, were we inclined to attempt it. It is undoubtedly unwieldy, and almost 
certainly beyond our technological and theoretical capabilities at present, but should not 
on this basis conclude that it is impossible. 
 More generally, some forms of emergentism may dispute other tenets. For 
example, Batterman (2004) insists that emergents need not necessarily have novel 
causal powers, because there are some situations in which it makes little sense to talk 
in this way. Instead, he insists that emergents should factor into novel explanations. But 
defending against every unique claim put forth by emergentists would yield at best only 
a pyrrhic victory, consuming too much time for too little theoretical gain. A line must be 
drawn somewhere, and the tenets identified by Kim seem to be a reasonable 
characterization of emergentism that remains true to what founders such as Broad and 
Alexander had in mind.  
 There are other problems related to this approach, such as the general claim that 
Kim’s model virtually guarantees reduction, and that for this reason it is unlikely to be 
accepted by many nonreductive-physicalists (Batterman, 2004). We can see 
Batterman’s point best in the first step of Kim’s model. In functionalizing E, it is 
automatically related to the reduction base by virtue of the properties in the base. The 
concern, I think, is that even ardent emergentists will allow for supervenience—that is, a 
deterministic relationship between certain properties in the reduction base and E. 
Wherever these basal properties occur, we expect to find E. But emergentists want to 
maintain that something more occurs too. Certainly E supervenes on properties or 
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conditions in the emergent base, but E is also a “brute fact” that cannot be explained or 
understood completely by knowledge of the emergent base. Yet Kim’s model allows for 
such reductive leaps by identifying the causal powers of the physical base with the 
causal powers of the properties that arise. Somehow, mysteriously, emergentists want 
to break this causal chain (or perhaps just weaken it) to include emergents with their 
own novel causal powers. But Kim insists that where there are emergents there are 
physical realizers, and where there are physical realizers as causes we need only 
speak of the non-mysterious causation between physical realizers. The upshot is that, if 
there are emergents, they are considerably more difficult to identify than was once 
thought; the haphazard labeling of many complex systems as emergent was mistaken. 
Kim’s model puts the burden of proof back on the emergentists by showing many 
properties and theories to be reducible to the level of their constituents, effectively 








 The basic ideas of emergence can be intuitively understood, yet they also seem 
to go against the grain of scientific investigation. It is almost certain that we will some 
day understand much of the macroscopic world at the microscopic level; the question is, 
will we understand it completely? Or will some aspects, being emergent, be forever 
beyond explanation at the level of physics (and instead simply be brute, contingent 
facts)? And of equal interest is the question whether, in cases where reductive 
explanation is possible, should the higher-level terminology be dispensed with 
altogether, or will it still serve some useful purpose? Despite our knowledge of life at 
both the cellular and molecular level it is often still convenient to use the higher-level 
descriptions, even when these descriptions convey nothing new; maybe this will always 
be true, that there is some positive value in the higher-level concepts regardless of their 
theoretical reducibility. But putting too much stock in these concepts, by, for example, 
asserting their existence as something that transcends their constituents, is something 
that, until empirically decided otherwise, should be avoided. In the case of life, there is 
as yet no reason beyond its (generally) increasing complexity to think it is emergent. Its 
features are demonstrably reducible to their molecular underpinnings; furthermore, 
when these features are collected together to form life, what follows is merely resultant, 
not novel. The claim of novelty, and indeed the claim of emergence, is a positive 
assertion, but there is nothing to point to in support of these claims; they appear instead 
to be based primarily on gaps in our current evidential base. And so it is for these 
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